Louisiana Law Review
Volume 45 | Number 5
May 1985

LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION. By Harold J. Berman. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp.
viii, 657. $32.50 (cloth). $12.95 (paper).
Ellis Sandoz

Repository Citation
Ellis Sandoz, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION. By Harold J. Berman.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. viii, 657. $32.50 (cloth). $12.95 (paper)., 45 La. L. Rev. (1985)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol45/iss5/15

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
LAW AND

REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN

By Harold J. Berman. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. viii,
657. $32.50 (cloth). $12.95 (paper).
LEGAL TRADITION.

Reviewed by Ellis Sandoz*
In 1898 a great legal historian wrote: "The attempt to draw an
unwavering line between 'spiritual' and 'temporal' affairs is hopeless."'
A distinguished successor has gone very much farther than that in the
monumental work before us, for Harold J. Berman concludes that "the
history of Western law, and especially of its origins, reveals its rootedness
in the deepest beliefs and emotions of a people. Without the fear of
purgatory and the hope of the Last Judgment, the Western legal tradition
could not have come into being" (p. 558). This is the challenging thesis
of a powerfully argued history and theory of law and jurisprudence.
Berman methodically (and repeatedly) takes aim at the prevailing dogmas
and Idols of the Theater 2 in conventional scholarship of every trendy
ideological stripe in a synthesis of polemic, analysis, and narrative history
presenting a master of his craft at his magisterial best. This is an
outstanding book, perhaps a great one.
The book is divided into two major parts, the first devoted to "The
Papal Revolution and the Canon Law" and the second to "The Formation of Secular Legal Systems," these major parts (of seven chapters
each) are flanked by an Introduction and a Conclusion. The 558 pages
of text is followed by 75 pages of explanatory and bibliographical notes.
The author's own statement of his project is succinct and worth quoting:
This book tells the following story: that once there was a civilization called "Western"; that it developed distinctive "legal"
institutions, values, and concepts; that these Western legal in-

Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Political Science, Louisiana State University. B.A. 1951, M.A. 1953,
Louisiana State University; Dr. oec. publ. 1965, University of Munich.
1. F. Maitland, Roman Canon Law in the Church of England 56-57 (1899), cited
in H. Berman, Law and Revolution 612 (1983) [hereinafter cited in text by page number
only].
2. F. Bacon, The New Organon Aphorism XLIV (Library of Liberal Arts ed. 1960)
begins as follows: "Lastly, these are Idols which have immigrated into men's minds from
the various dogmas of philosophies, and also from wrong laws of demonstration. These
I call Idols of the Theater, because in my judgment all the received systems are but so
many stage plays, representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic
fashion." Id. at 49. For Berman's own catalog of challenges to conventional wisdom,
see H. Berman, supra note 1, at 2-44, 275-76, 538-42. This is to say that the author's
intention is avowedly iconoclastic in the Baconian tradition.
*
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stitutions, values, and concepts were consciously transmitted from
generation to generation over centuries, and thus came to constitute a "tradition"; that the Western legal tradition was born
of a "revolution" and thereafter, during the course of many
centuries, has been periodically interrupted and transformed by
revolutions; and that in the twentieth century the Western legal
tradition is in a revolutionary crisis greater than any other in
its history, one that some believe has brought it virtually to an
end (p. 1).
Very much later, Berman adds: "The individual parts of the story told
in this book are well known to specialists in various fields of history
and law. Yet the story as a whole is singularly unfamiliar and conflicts
with conventional preconceptions in many ways" (p. 538).
Now, to say that this book is devoted primarily to a legal history
of the twelfth century in the West is true, but neither very alluring to
the ordinary lawyer (or political scientist) nor adequate to the subject
- even if we add with Berman that the twelfth century was "the legal
century, the century in which the Western legal tradition was formed"
(p. 120). The matter must be put into the context that makes the book
exciting reading and pathbreaking analysis. The terms revolution and
crisis signal the relevant context; for the Investiture Struggle that reached
a head in 1075 with Gregory VII's radical assertion of papal independence
and supremacy in the Dictates of the Pope, and triggered a half-century
of wars and lesser conflicts until finally compromised in 1122 in the
Concordat of Worms, is renamed "the Papal Revolution" by Berman
(pp. 94-100). Here is the first of the great Western revolutions, the one
that marks the establishment of Western civilization generally and the
Western legal order specifically. It is here that Western (and modern)
civilization begins, not in Reformation or Renaissance or such subsequent
major event as the Puritan Revolution of the seventeenth century or
the Enlightenment and French Revolution of the eighteenth. The conventional periodization of history into Ancient, Medieval, and Modern
is itself discarded as "fallacious." "Modern Times" begin with the
reformation and renaissance effected by Hildebrand and his papal successors in the twelfth century, and the conventional "Renaissance and
Reformation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were directed against"
the earlier epochal events of the Papal Revolution (p. 538; see also pp.

13-16,

86-119).3

The extensive meaning Berman. gives to the term Papal Revolution
will concern us shortly, but his interpretation of its central thrust requires

3. "Papal Revolution" is used by E. Rosenstock-Huessy, Die europaischen Revolutionen 168 (2d ed. 1951). Rosenstock-Huessy taught Berman at Dartmouth College in
the 1930's and inspired much of the present volume, see H. Berman, supra note 1, at
574-75, 636. The vast literature on the Investiture Struggle is summarized id. at 86, 574-
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immediate notice, for the chief impetus of this revolution is an emphatic
institutionalization of Christianity through the creation of the comprehensive new legal system of the canon law and the establishment of the
new corporate political entity of the church. The general effect is to
solidify into procedure and practice the old theoretical principles of
Gelasius' Two Swords by emphatically elevating the spiritual authority
over the secular order and unifying it under the papacy. 4 By a range
of complex developments, Berman argues, the Roman Catholic Church
is transformed into the first true state and turns its attention for the
first time to a concerted reform of the world, even as it continues the
vocation of saving souls for eternity. The chief vehicle for reform of
the world is the centrality of law. As Berman writes:
It was this attitude toward law, and toward the relation of the
church to the world, that changed dramatically in the late eleventh and the twelfth centuries. The church set out to reform
both itself and the world by law. It established itself as a visible,
corporate, legal entity, independent of imperial, royal, feudal,
and urban authorities. Autonomous bodies of law were articulated, first within the ecclesiastical polity and then within the
various secular polities, in part to maintain the cohesion of each
polity, in part to achieve the reform of each, in part to keep
an equilibrium among them all. These new developments were
only possible, however, because the foundations for them had
been laid in the earlier period. It was then that a basis was
established for the formation of stable communities; that basis
was the integrated populus christianusin which there was neither
a separation of church from state nor a separation of law from
other modes of social control (p. 83).
Central among these complex lines of development is the act of institutionalization whereby the Papal Revolution "gave birth to the modern
Western state - the first example of which, paradoxically, was the
church itself" (p. 113). Berman affirms that "[tihis is one of the main
themes of my book" (p. 577).5

The extensive meaning of the Papal Revolution in Berman's sense
of the term goes far beyond the passage of time and events from 1075
to 1122; it embraces all of the major developments of the period as a

4. Pope Gelasius 1 (492-496) stated this doctrine to the Emperor Anastasius: "Two
[swords] there are, august emperor, by which this world is chiefly ruled, the sacred
authority of the priesthood and the royal power . . . if the bishops themselves, recognizing
that the imperial office was conferred on you by divine disposition, obey your laws so
far as the sphere of public order is concerned . . . with what zeal, I ask you, ought you
to obey those who have been charged with administering the sacred mysteries [in matters
of religion]?" Quoted id. at 92; see also analysis id. at 92-94, 201, 279, 528.
5. J. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State 22 (1970), is a chief
source of this idea; cf. H. Berman, supra note 1, at 577.
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"total" revolution must, if it is to meet that criterion of revolution
(pp. 99-103). Thus, it includes the rediscovery of the Roman law around
1080 and the founding of the great law schools to study the recovered
texts from Justinian's compilation of circa 534 A.D. and the establishment of the universities more generally. It extends to the work of Gratian
who thought he could build a system of law on the Golden Rule, "Do
unto others as you would have them do unto you," ' 6 and whose mammoth A Concordance of Discordant Canons appeared in Bologna in
1140 as the first comprehensive and systematic legal treatise in the
"history of the West, and perhaps in the history of mankind" (p. 143).
It extends to the founding of modern political science in the work of
John of Salisbury, whose Policraticusin 1159 first elaborated "an organic
theory of the secular political order" (p. 286), one expression of the
developmental nature of Western history and the response of the secular
communities to the centralization of the church effected by the revolution
there. It extends to rise of the plurality of overlapping and conflicting
legal and political jurisdictions that responsively arose in tension with
the church and canon law, including the feudal, manorial, mercantile,
urban, and variety of royal law that are discussed by Berman at length
in separate chapters and compose the secular law (pp. 273-519). More
centrally, it extends to philosophy and science themselves as major
intellectual structures of the civilization now emphatically devoted to
Truth through reason no less than by faith and to the reforming of
the world. And, finally, it extends to the essential tension within the
comprehensive Western vision of reality which Berman characterizes as
typified in the conflict between Peter Abelard and St. Bernard of Clairvaux as going to the heart of the matter.
The struggle and tension between rational, scientific, and formalist attitudes, on the one hand, and mystical, poetic, and
charismatic attitudes, on the other, help to explain why it took
three generations for the new jurisprudence to establish itself
and centuries more for it to run its course, and why ultimately
it was in turn challenged by subsequent revolutions (p. 196).
Bernard denounced the study of Roman law before the Council of Reims
in 1129, which then prohibited monks from studying it. In the sixteenth
century the Protestant reformers sharply attacked the Roman Catholic
Church for excessive legalism, and Martin Luther attacked the concept
of the union of the visible corporate church under law, burned the
books of canon law, and proclaimed his belief "that the true church
can have no legal character whatever, that it is an invisible communion
of the faithful" (pp. 196-97). The Papal Revolution thereby gave way
to the next great Western convulsion, the Protestant Reformation (1517-

6. Matthew 7:12. Cf. Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional
Thought, 1150-1650, at 108 (1982).
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1555)-a restorative movement of Augustinian inspiration.
But the fundamentals lie with the intensive aspect of the Papal
Revolution and the implications of Berman's theme that it "made Christianity into a political and legal program. The church became a state.
Canon law became a specific means, first, of holding the church-state
together, and second, of reforming the world" (p. 528). He compares
the Papal Revolution with "an atomic explosion that split Germanic
Christendom into two parts: the church, viewed as an independent,
visible, corporate, legal structure; and the secular order, viewed as divided
among various polities" (p. 531). The question is what kind of political
and legal program is Christianity? The answer, to begin with, is that
it is essentially revolutionary. This means that by virtue of its principles,
it is intrinsically unstable, and the revolutionary moment sets in motion
a process of change that moves (perhaps by evolutionary degrees) from
crisis to crisis, as Berman traces the process through the six great Western
revolutions that he identifies: Papal, German (or Protestant Reformation), English, American, French, and Russian (p. 11-33). As is evident
from the list, the "Christianity" of the revolutionary process is handed
over to institutions other than the church with the passage of the
centuries, a clue to the "unprecedented crisis" which Berman believes
the West presently faces-but more of that in a moment. At present
we must emphasize the chief point: "The most important consequence
of the Papal Revolution was that it introduced into Western history the
experience of revolution itself" (p. 118). On that occasion, the movement
was away from the dreary Augustinian understanding of earthly existence
as a meaningless age growing old awaiting only slow deterioration until
the Last Judgment. 7 Rather, the new Gothic architecture signalled with
dramatic power the revolutionaries' sense of time and prospects of
reform, progress, amelioration, earthly hope of an improving world,
and meeting in the here and now some of the "preconditions of salvation" in the beyond. "The great cathedrals expressed, in their soaring
spires and flying buttresses and elongated vaulted arches, a dynamic
spirit of movement upward, a sense of achieving, of incarnation of
ultimate values" (p. 118).
The revolutionary mind of Christian politics moves in a spectrum
of ever intensifying volatility from doing good to others by loving your
neighbor as yourself, to social reform, to the general progress of society
as a civilizational dogma, to an apocalyptical vision of a transfigured
world and mankind at the End Time of the Creation in a Millennium
or in the translation of time into the Eternal Sabbath of the Eighth

7. See the account of St. Augustine's theology of history in K. Loewith, Meaning
in History 160-73 (1949).
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Day.' The eschatological vision of the end time is basic both to Christianity and to every revolution subsequent to its reception, as Berman's
old teacher at Dartmouth College taught him in the late 1930's (pp.
27, 636). 9 It was, in significant part, to combat the imminent expectation
of a radical transfiguration of the world that Augustine wrote the City
of God and distinguished the civitas terrena and the civitas Dei, the
one a meaningless rise and fall of secular powers and a saeculum
senescens, the other the repository of beatitude and ultimate fulfillment
as the outcome of mankind's providential pilgrimage through time in
the church considered as itself the mystical body of Christ present in
history (cf. p. 27).l0 The Augustinian problem of how to control the
lust for transfiguration is a permanent issue in post-Christian reality.
By Berman's account, however, "regeneration was for the first time
seen as applicable also to the secular society" in the Papal revolution
and its aftermath (p. 28; cf. pp. 111-12). Otherworldly aspirations are
infused into this world in the church become a state. The core meaning
of "reform" as an activity of the church become state is "transform!"
As Berman writes of each of the great revolutions, starting with the
Papal Revolution of 1075: "Without the belief that this world ...could
be regenerated-and that such regeneration would lead to the fulfillment
of man's ultimate destiny-the great revolutions of Western history could
not have occurred" (p. 28). Side by side with the futurism, however,
goes also the notion that a primordial time of founding is being restored
as a condition to achieving the final victory: "Each [revolution] also
placed the historical old and new within a framework of an original

8. In Augustine's words:
"The sixth [day] is passing, and cannot be measured by any number of generations .... After this period God shall rest as on the seventh day, when He
shall give us (who shall be the seventh day) rest in Himself . . . the seventh
shall be our Sabbath, which shall be brought to a close, not by an evening,
but by the Lord's day, as an eighth and eternal day, consecrated by the
resurrection of Christ, and prefiguring the eternal repose not only of the spirit,
but also of the body. There we shall rest and see, see and love, love and praise.
This is what shall be in the end without end. For what other end do we propose
to ourselves than to attain to the kingdom of which there is no end?"
Augustine, City of God XXII. 30, at 867 (M. Dodds trans. 1950) (not cited or quoted
by Berman). An issue left unresolved by Berman's analysis is whether the Papal Revolution
affects the transcendental destiny of mankind as here expressed in Augustine's vision of
eschatological destiny and the stages of history.
9. Cf. generally E. Rosenstock-Huessy, supra note 2.
10. See Augustine, supra note 8, XX. 7, 8, 9, at 725-26, where Augustine argues
that the awaited Millennium of Christ's victory has already begun (by way of roundly
dismissing chiliastic expectations as "ridiculous fables") and writes of the church as Christ
in history: "[Tihe Church even now is the kingdom of Christ, and the kingdom of heaven.
Accordingly, even now His saints reign with Him .. " For the "ridiculous fancies" or
"fables" of the Chiliasts and Millenarians who hope for an earthly thousand-years of
perfect bliss, a time of material abundance and carnal pleasure, see id. XX. 7, at 719.
For analysis, see E. Voegelin, New Science of Politics 107-10 (1952).
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creation, or state of nature, and a final end, an ultimate victory" so
that every great revolution is characterized as both a restoration of first
truths and the condition for final regeneration and perfection (pp. 28,
18-21).
"The pursuit of the Millennium" as manifested in the Papal Revolution and thereafter is controlled through the law, and Berman argues
that this generalization holds true for all six Western revolutions, including the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (pp. 28-33). The character of
the law of the Papal Revolution is his concern in this book, however,
and requires our attention here. The central point is stated this way:
the "fundamental concept of the Western legal tradition" is "the concept
of a society that has the power to transform itself in time by the rapid
and continuous infusion of divine and natural law into ecclesiastical and
secular legal institutions" (p. 197).
Virtually all of the modern legal systems originated "right in the
middle of the Middle Ages" (p. 42). This is the time of the Papal
Revolution, and it is the time when "law became disembedded," i.e.,
through the professionalization of jurists, judges, and lawyers, and the
rise of the universities and first law schools, the law for the first time
emerged as an "autonomous, integrated, developing body of legal principles and procedures" (p. 86). Three elements are at the roots of the
Western legal tradition: "the discovery of the legal writings compiled
under the Roman Emperor Justinian, the scholastic method of analyzing
and synthesizing them, and the teaching of law in the universities of
Europe" (p. 123). The work of Justinian's jurists that was discovered
in the 1080's is a manuscript in four parts dating from the sixth century
and the law, not of the Roman Empire in the West, but of Byzantium.
The parts consist of the Code, comprising the ordinances and decisions
of the emperors prior to Justinian (in twelve books, taking up 1,034
pages in a modern English translation); the Novels, composing the laws
of Justinian himself (562 pages); the Institutes, which is a textbook for
beginning law students (173 pages); and the most important part, the
Digest or Pandects, which contains a great variety of extracted opinions
of Roman jurists on legal questions set forth in fifty books (2,734
pages). The law school at Bologna probably "was founded primarily
for the purpose of studying that text" (p. 127). Since this was the law
of no actually existing community, Justinian's law took its place with
other authorities of what Edward S. Corwin calls the "higher law":
the Bible, Plato, Aristotle, and (later) Cicero, and the church fathers,
all declaratory of Truth itself and hence the law "applicable at all times
and in all places" (p. 122).'1 But then Rome was considered to be

11. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
Harv. L. Rev. 149-85, 365-409 (1928). The famous passage from Cicero echoed in the
text reads:
"There is in fact a true law (vera lex) - namely right reason (recta ratio) ....
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eternal and the Roman Empire to exist in a special way into the period
of our discussion in a continuation that was universal and permanent
(cf. pp. 204-05, 603-04).
The centrality of truth to the theory of law must be stressed in this
context. The "disembedding" of the law meant in substantial part the
confrontation of the Gregorian reformers with the nearly universally
prevailing customary law. Faced with an obnoxious custom, the Gregorians would "appeal over it to truth, quoting the aphorism of Tertullian and St. Cyprian [that] Christ said 'I am the truth.' He did not
say 'I am the custom.' Gregory VII quoted this against Emperor Henry
IV. Becket quoted it against King Henry II" (pp. 112-13, 258). Berman
gives high place to Gratian for so applying the scholastic technique of
reconciling contradictions to extrapolate from Justinian's law. This law,
interlaced with other legal sources and with philosophy, was in coherent
whole denoted by the twelfth century phrase corpus juris Romani-the
designation of the European Romanists and canonists, not of the earlier
Roman lawyers themselves. Coherence, supremacy over the political
authorities, historicity or ongoing growth by its own internal logic, and
grounding in transcendent truth and justice are leading characteristics
of the Western legal tradition (pp. 9-10). Gratian's great work of 1140
provided the first comprehensive expression of all these characteristics
in a systematic analysis and synthesis and presented the various sources
of law in a hierarchical order. He is "the great founder of the science
of canon law" (pp. 187, 598).
He started by interposing the concept of natural law between
the concepts of divine law and human law. Divine law is the
will of God reflected in revelation, especially the revelation of
Holy Scripture. Natural law also reflects God's will; however,
it is found both in divine revelation and in human reason and
conscience. From this Gratian could conclude that "the laws
[leges] of princes [i.e., of the secular authorities] ought not to
prevail over natural law Uus naturale]." Likewise ecclesiastical
"laws" may not contravene natural "law." "Ius," he wrote,
"isthe genus, lex is a species of it."

To invalidate this law by human legislation is never morally right, nor is it
permissible ever to restrict its operation, and to annul it wholly is impossible.
.. . It will not lay down one rule at Rome and another at Athens, nor will it
be one rule today and another tommorrow. But there will be one law, eternal
and unchangeable, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will be, as
it were, one common master and ruler of men, namely God, who is the author
of this law, its interpreter, and its sponsor. The man who will not obey it will
abandon his better self, and, in denying the true nature of a man, will thereby
suffer the severest of penalties, though he has escaped all the other consequences
which men call punishment."
On the Commonwealth [De re publical 215-16 (G. Sabine & S. Smith trans. 1976). Berman
does not cite Corwin.
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Gratian also concluded that, as a matter of natural law,
"princes are bound by and shall live according to their laws."
The theory that customs must yield to natural law was one
of the greatest achievements of the canonists (p. 145).
Gratian's reliance on natural law and on reason was philosophically
informed from Greek, and especially Stoic, sources to produce the
coherent statement given in his sprawling 1,000 page work. Although
there was little theory in the work of Justinian's jurists and although
the Greek philosophers were not lawyers, "in the twelfth century the
canonists and Romanists of western Europe combined the Greek capacity
for philosophy with the Roman capacity for law. In addition, they
deepened the earlier concepts of reason and equity by adding to them
the Judaic and Christian concept of conscience, which they related to
mercy and love" (p. 146).
It is a noteworthy further argument of Berman's that the legal science
of the kind just glimpsed in Gratian's work "was a progenitor of the modern Western sciences" (p. 151). Science is primarily a Western achievement, and the openness, objectivity, skepticism, and devotion to reason
characteristic of the West, and vital to scientific inquiry, "have stemmed
from a complex relationship between the sacred and the profane" (p. 158).
The de-divinization of the world (to use Eric Voegelin's phrase) 2 fostered
by the emphatic separation of ecclesiastical and secular polities (thereby
ending the German sacred kingship) coincided with the rise of science. What
is to be noted, however, is that such scientific inquiry arose in the ecclesiastical sphere in the work of such Western theologians as Anselm and
Abelard who subjected the evidence of the divine mysteries themselves to
rational scrutiny and even skeptical examination. They concluded, for example, that Christ's deputy himself, the Pope, was subject to deposition if
found to be a heretic or if guilty of a crime that would scandalize the church.
What seems decisive in the rise of science, then, is "a new attitude toward
the sacred itself. The church, though still understood to be the 'mystical
body of Christ,' was viewed as also having a visible, legal, corporate identity and an earthly mission to reform the world." Berman continues:
The emphasis shifted from sacredness in the sense of otherworldliness to the incarnation of the sacred, which meant its manifestation in the political, economic, and social life of the times. That,
in turn, made it necessary to examine the sacred, the spiritual, with
scientific value premises. Only when the effort was made to study
God objectively, and God's laws, did it become possible to attempt
to study secular life, and secular laws, objectively - and eventually nature and nature's laws (p. 158).

12.

E. Voegelin, supra note 10, at 107. Berman does not cite Voegelin.
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Perhaps the most original pages in Berman's book occur in chapter four
which is devoted to the theological sources of the western legal tradition.
As noted above, the religious faith that sees ultimate human destiny in
terms of purgatory and Last Judgment is central to our legal tradition by
this account of it: "Western legal science is a secular theology" (p. 165).
By Berman's analysis, Christianity during the first millennium was an
apocalyptic faith and not a social program, although it contributed to a
revision of laws in the direction of greater humanity. It stressed dying to
the world and reconciliation of man to God and men to one another, so
that the exemplary Christian life was the monastic ideal. The biblical God
revealed in Christ is both Redeemer and Judge. At the end of history looms
the Last Judgment, initially construed as the inauguration of divine rule
in the world to come. In the early part of the eleventh century, however,
a shift occurred in the understanding of the Last Judgment through the
emergence of belief in an intermediate period of purging between the death
of the individual and the Last Judgment which will occur with the return
of Christ as divine judge. At the Last Judgment all souls that ever lived
will stand resurrected before the Judge and either be admitted to eternal
bliss in the Kingdom of God or consigned to eternal perdition with the
devil.
The emergent doctrine of Purgatory was conceived as a temporal condition of punishment for individual souls of Christians: original sin had
been cleansed by baptism, but the sins subsequently committed in life required as a matter of justice a price to be paid after death, in time, for
sins not fully expiated in life. "Expiation meant payment of a price, not
gradual reformation: the soul remained guilty (indebted) until the full price
was paid" (p. 169), and that payment meant that the "Christian soul remained in purgatory until fully purged by suffering" (p. 170). A universal
democracy characterizes the Last Judgment and gives essential meaning to
life itself; every human being will stand before the divine judge and give
accounting. So, also, Purgatory is a Christian democracy where proportional equality of punishment is justly meted out to princes and popes no
less than serfs and thieves according to the gravity of their sins. Because
the church, however, has jurisdiction over purgatory and the Pope administers the Treasury of Merits, the time to be spent in purgatory can be
determined by clerical decision. Thus, at the end of the eleventh century,
Pope Urban II granted the first "plenary indulgence" to those who joined
the army of the First Crusade, releasing them from liability for punishment
in purgatory for all sins committed prior to that time (p. 171).
The legalization of life after death meant that everyone who died in
the faith was assured of eternal bliss at the Last Judgment, so that the
vindication of the law brought a happy outcome and God's role became
merely ministerial. "Man was beginning to take the center of the stage"
(p. 171). The new holiday of All Souls Day was introduced to symbolize
the Last Judgment as a universal "Law Day" when all souls that ever lived
are to come before Christ to be eternally convicted or acquitted (p. 195).
The Atonement of Christ through the dimensions of incarnation-crucifix-
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ion-resurrection had achieved the demands of divine justice and divine
mercy through the assurance of eternal beatitude for all penitent, baptized
Christians because their natural sin was already forgiven and their actual
sins would be fully expiated through the legalities of church-administered
proportional punishment in purgatory prior to the Last Judgment. Christ
as ominous Judge in the end time then became more "the divine Brother
whose sacrifice on the cross served to reconcile God and man" (p. 195).
Holy Communion (the eucharist), too, assumed a central place in worship
and constantly reminded the faithful of the paradox of divine punishment
and divine forgiveness through repeated enactment and incorporation into
the lives of the men and women composing the Christian community.
Through an intricate web of legal rules devised by the theologians and
canonists of the time, it was demonstrated that God rules through law;
hence, the ecclesiastical and secular authorities ordained by him justly declare legal principles and impose sanctions and remedies for their violation.
The belief in a God of justice who operates a lawful universe,
punishing and rewarding according to principles of proportion,
mercifully mitigated in exceptional cases, corresponded to the belief in a complex social unity, Christendom, in which the dialectic
of interacting realms and polities was regulated by a similar kind
of justice-based-on-law and law-based-on-justice, with mercy playing an exceptional role (pp. 196-97).
Distinctive to Western law as it takes shape in the eleventh and twelfth
centuries, Berman emphasizes, is the vision of God as not only transcendent but as immanent, too, through incarnation in Christ. Incarnation is
the central reality of the universe, and the regeneration of the world and
its redemption are pursued with great energy as a consequence. This is the
significance he attaches to the liturgical identification of crucifixion with
redemption. Christ is primarily the conqueror of sin, and it is Christ on
the cross that is emphasized. The church itself becomes less a communion
of saints in heaven than a community of sinners on earth. The sacraments
are highly ritualized and formally limited to seven in the twelfth century.
The sacrament of holy communion from the eleventh century is rigorously
defined and systematized to become centrally important as the principal
symbol of church membership. The miraculous real presence of Christ in
the host as the source of its grace-giving power is designated "transubstantiation" at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 and the Eucharist (preceded
by the sacrament of penance) made mandatory for all Christians at least
once a year, usually at Easter. Penance itself as the sacrament of confession of sins and absolution underwent significant development, so that by
the twelfth century the priest's Ego te absolvo ("I absolve you") came to
be interpreted, not merely as his certification of God's forgiveness (declarative), but as performative or sacramental (p. 173). Deprivation of the
right to take communion marked expulsion from church membership and,
hence, participation in divine incarnation itself as a member of the body
of Christ. Berman writes of the close connection of the mystery of the
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atonement and the Eucharist (especially in light of Anselm's theory) as
sacramental incorporation into Christ:
sacramental incorporation into Christ was conceived in terms of
identification with Christ on the cross, not with the risen Christ.
Thus the centrality of the eucharist in the second millennium of
the history of the church, as contrasted with the centrality of baptism in the first millennium, is connected with the later emphasis
on the incarnation of God in human history as contrasted with the
earlier emphasis on the deification of man in the kingdom of heaven
(p. 593).
"For the scholastics of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries the way of
the knowledge of God was the way of incarnation, not deification" (p.
595).
The principles of constitutionalism are theoretically refined and instituted in canon and secular law systems during the Papal Revolution, even
if the term itself is not coined until the American Revolution (p. 9). Supremacy of the law is a familiar principle tied to the notion, on one hand,
that human law must conform to the superior natural, divine, and eternal
law and, hence, approximate perfect reason and justice to be valid. On the
other hand, the law rests in some sense on the will or consent of the community or citizen-body, since reason and liberty are natural attributes of
all human beings as bearers of the image of God, and since the community
is composed of persons who are both Christians and universally sinners,
so that none is naturally so fit through superiority or perfection as to rule
others but by their consent. The moral equality arising from the sharing
of a common sinful humanity is illustrated by the requirement, in cases
where capital punishment is the sentence, that the executioner "kneel down
before the condemned man at the last moment

. . .

to ask his forgiveness

for the act he was about the commit" (p. 184). In Azo's development of
the concept of sovereignty from the Roman law texts concerning jurisdictio
and imperium in the first quarter of the thirteenth century, he concluded
that all rulers have imperium (sovereignty) "because they have iurisdictio,
the right to establish law in the respective states. But what was the source
of that lawmaking right? Azo answered that the source was in the corpus,
the universitas, the communitas. Jurisdiction did not descend downward
from the emperor but upward from the corporate community" (p. 292).
Gratian and Huguccio taught that it lay within the power of the community
to try and depose the pope for heinous offenses (p. 214). John of Salisbury
(in 1159) taught that "[t]o kill a tyrant is not merely lawful, but right and
just" (quoted p. 282), a view rejected by Thomas Aquinas a century later
as "not in accord with apostolic teaching;" Thomas advocates deposition
of kings who have become tyrants, if "to provide itself with a king belongs
to the right of a given multitude" or, if it does not, to look for remedy to
a higher authority if one has provided the king with his dominion. Otherwise, prayer and repentance are recommended. 3
13. T. Aquinas, On Kingship VI, in The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas 18893, esp. 190 (D. Bigongiari ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Political Ideas of Aquinas].
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Rule of law as it emerges in the eleventh and twelfth centuries consists
of essentially three things: (1) the authority of the ecclesiastical and secular
authorities to enact law and rule by it through judicial systems and governmental agencies; (2) the readiness of the heads of ruling bodies to obey
the laws of their own devising, until modified through further legislation,
or to rule under law; and (3) the respect of the laws of other jurisdictions
when just and acceptance of them as binding one's own jurisdiction. A
major characteristic of the Western legal tradition as it arose in this period
is the plurality of interrelated jurisdictions that tended mutually to reinforce the principles of rule by law and rule under law: "If the church was
to have inviolable legal rights, the state had to accept those rights as a
lawful limitation upon its own supremacy" and vice versa (p. 292). The
harmonizing of the laws of various jurisdictions and their acceptance as
mutually valid depends on the hierarchical conception of the law as divinely instituted and of God as the ultimate source of all law as made known
through Scripture, natural law, and human laws that participate in (and
conform with) the higher law. In turn, this view gives force to the claims
of such English writers as Bracton that the king is "under God and the
law" and that it is not the king that makes the law but the law which
makes the king. But this principle is not merely English, famous though it
is for statements there in Magna Carta and elsewhere. The Sachsenspiegel
of the early thirteenth century legalizes resistance against unlawful commands or acts of the king and his judges as both a right and a duty. A
legal formula of Aragon demands that the subjects obey the king so long
as he performs his duties, "and if not, not" (p. 293). In short, the fundamental law embodies absolute right, and all subordinate law is to be
given effect only to the degree that it conforms to that absolute standard.
The tyrant's laws, according to Thomas Aquinas, are not laws but perversions of law and disobedience to them and resistance by the people does
not constitute sedition; rather, it is the king become tyrant who commits
sedition against the community.14 Aquinas sounds very much like John
Locke did 400 years later. 5 Thus, the scriptural admonition is basic: "We
ought to obey God rather than men.' ' 6 And Aquinas summarizes in this
way:
Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required
by the order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority is not
just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects
are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in order

14. T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in Political Ideas of Aquinas, supra note 13,
I-I Q. 42, A. 2 ad 3, at 94-95; see also id. 1-1l
Q. 95, A. 2, at 58; id. Q. 92 ad 4,
at 56.
15. J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 239, at 442-43, in Two Treatises of
Government (P. Laslett ed. 1963) ("When a King has Dethron'd himself, and put himself
in a state of War with his People .... ).
16. Acts 5:29. Quoted by T. Aquinas, supra note 14, 11-11, Q. 104, A. 5, at 169.
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to avoid scandal or danger.1 7
As for kings, Bracton and Aquinas agree that they are bound to do justice
and be obedient to the laws but that they cannot be coerced to do so but
only directed by reason and conscience (p. 293).' s This view overlooks,
however, the emerging checks and balances of the English constitution as
wonderfully exemplified in Magna Carta (1215), Chapter 61, as the very
theory of that monumental event and its legacy.
Among much else of interest and importance to the emergence of constitutionalism from the side of Berman's discussion of comparative secular
law, urban law is especially noteworthy and must be mentioned here. The
cities arose as integrated communities formed on the basis of actual or
implied covenants, often in the form of solemn collective oaths of the
entire citizenry to adhere to the terms of the charter of the city read aloud
to them. This fundamental act of consent constitutes the society in much
the way the "social contract" of subsequent political theory is intended by
Hooker and Locke to be the basis of free government.' 9 And "the reality
of modern constitutionalism ... was present first in the urban law systems
of western Europe in the eleventh and twelfth centuries" (p. 396). Thus,
the charters of these cities embody their laws and are the first written
constitutions. The systems of government thereby established bear striking
similarity to modern constitutional arrangements: the urban governments
had limited powers, were often divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches which checked and balanced one another; periodic elections
to office were held; laws were published and collections of laws issued;
and judges held office on condition of their good behavior or until recalled
by the citizenry. Civil rights were guaranteed by the charter; included a
trial procedure with judgment by peers; no arbitrary arrests; no imprisonment without due process; citizens bore arms and voted by right; rich
and poor were theoretically equal before the law; immigrants achieved the
rights of citizens after a year and a day residence. Urban civil liberties
usually included exemption from normal feudal duties and taxes and often
restricted the king's prerogative in important ways, such as forbidding him
to impose forced loans. Finally, the urban citizenry's constitutional law
included rights and liberties of participation in popular government through
elections, office-holding, and giving of consent to laws. "This, in turn,
was connected with the constitutional theory, never fully accepted but never
fully rejected, that political power was ultimately vested in the whole body
of citizens" (p. 397). Thus, even though England's towns were less democratic and more dependent upon the crown than those in Italy, Germany,
Flanders, and parts of France, many borough officials were elected, and

17. T. Aquinas, supra note 14, Il-l, Q. 104, A. 5, at 172.
18. Id. Q. 96, A. 5 ad 3, at 74.
19. 1 R. Hooker, Of the Law of Ecclesiastical Polity 1. 10. 4, at 190-91 (C. Morris
ed. 1907); J. Locke, supra note 15, §§ 95-106, at 348-56. The material cited here in notes
13-19 is not cited or quoted by Berman.
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London's citizens obtained the right to elect their sheriff and a justiciary
in 1131 and their mayor in 1231 (p. 398).
There is promise of a "sequel" by Professor Berman to the present
volume, although there is no indication of its character (p. 636). However,
one would guess that it will continue the comparative history of Western
law here so splendidly given for the initial phase in the Papal Revolution
and that it will more systematically elaborate the "social theory of law"
(pp. 44, 556) alluded to in the present volume. Berman is plainly dissatisfied with reigning legal theory and jurisprudence, and for good reason. He
sees them as being at loggerheads with the very foundations of the Western
legal system and as a considerable part of the "crisis" of our tradition that
so alarms him. Indeed, the sense of urgency in the book arises from profound anxieties so acute that he confesses (on the very first page of the
book) his personal desperation: "It is said that a drowning man may see
his whole life flash before him." He then continues:
That may be his unconscious effort to find within his experience
the resources to extricate himself from impending doom. So I have
had to view the Western tradition of law and legality, or order and
justice, in a very long historical perspective, from its beginnings,
in order to find a way out of our present predicament. ...
Because the age is ending, we are now able to discern its beginnings. ...
It is impossible not to sense the social disintegration, the breakdown of communities, that has taken place in Europe, North
America, and other parts of Western civilization in the twentieth
century. ...
The traditional symbols of community in the West . . . have
been above all religious and legal. In the twentieth century . . religion has become largely a private affair, while law has become
largely a matter of practical expediency. The connection between
the religious metaphor and the legal metaphor has been broken.
Neither expresses any longer the community's vision of its future
and its past; neither commands any longer its passionate loyalty.
One need not bemoan these changes. They may be a good thing.
They are no doubt inevitable. In any case, they mark the end of
an era, and since there is no going back, the only question is,
"How do we go forward" (pp. v-vi)?
How ought one react to the grim discovery that the cumulative crisis
unfolding before our eyes is terminal for our civilization? In the era of the
Moral Majority at home and Solidarity abroad, we can roundly deny that
our history is whimpering to its end before us and embrace the Twainian
postulate that our demise is greatly exaggerated. After all, dire prophecies
of The End of civilization-even of the world-have been rampant for
millennia, a veritable apocalyptic thread in history running from Spengler
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and Nietzsche through an illustrious lineage back to Lot and Noah. Take
heart! As to the fatalistic or crypto-Marxian notion of inevitability of the
impending disintegration of the world, we can recall Mr. Justice Brandeis's
' 20
bon mot that "the irresistible is often only that which is not resisted."
We can also be reminded from Eric Voegelin's elaborate diagnosis of the
crisis of the age that "[nio one is obliged to take part in the spiritual crisis
of a society; on the contrary, everyone is obliged to avoid this folly and
2
live his life in order.'' '
To a considerable degree, these lessons are taught by the massive work
before us-for Berman plainly does not think that the degradation of Western civilization into ideological and technological barbarism is "a good
thing." Nor can we subscribe to a fellow-lawyer's verdict that "this truly
magnificent book is a last hurrah, if not a memorial in the genteel tradition, for a world which exists today only in one's memory," a "superb
memorial ' 22 to an irrelevant past. To the contrary, Berman is doing the
historian's duty of recovering the past for a generation that has substantially forgotten who it is they are, if they ever knew. His purpose is therapeutic. And the reaction of some of his commentators suggests that the
crisis is acute enough among his colleagues to justify his anguish. 23
Berman, by recovering the history of the origins of Western law, seeks
to counter the crude pragmatism, cynicism, and reductionism in contemporary legal teaching that views law as a set of technical devices for getting
things done, separates it from history, identifies all law with national law,
and our own national legal history with all that is relevant in legal history.
He calls for a new jurisprudence that is integrative and overcomes the
fallacies of an exclusively positivist or natural law or historical and socialeconomic jurisprudence, one that goes beyond them (pp. vi-vii). While his
social theory of law remains to be fully developed, the starting point is to
understand that just because Hegel was wrong does not mean Marx was
right: neither a pure rationalism or idealism nor a materialism supplies an
adequate frame of reference. "Western legal institutions cannot ... . be
explained satisfactorily either as mere superstructure or as mere ideology."
Berman continues:
Conventional social theory errs in supposing that historical change
is caused by changes in basic social, economic, and political conditions alone. There is, in fact, no such thing as social, economic,
and political conditions (or forces) alone; they are always part of
a context of perception and feeling. Nor are there values ideas,
beliefs - alone; as a social matter, they are always interconnected

20. Quoted in I. Berlin, Historical Inevitability 78 (1954).
21. E. Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism 22-23 (1968).
22. Roberts, Book Review, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1119, 1127-28 (1984).
23. See Tigar, Book Review, 17 UCD L. Rev. 1035 (1984); Belliotti, Book Review,
50 Brooklyn L. Rev. 351 (1984). That political science is nowadays as confused as legal
science can be seen from D. Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science (1984).
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To understand why a great historical change occurred, one must
go . . .to the times and circumstances themselves . . . .They were
not merely "manifestations" and "instruments"; they happened;
... . legal institutions . . . cannot be explained satisfactorily in
any other way. In addition to the objective materialist "why" and
the subjective idealist "why" there is a historical "why"-a "why"
that adds to the outer and inner dimensions of the inquiry both a
past and a future dimension (p. 403).
It seems wholly becoming for a lawyer to stress that empirical reality, or
the historical facts themselves, deserve equal weight with spiritual and material components of theories of human institutions and existence. Thus,
law is not only an instrument of domination (positivism), but also an
expression of moral standards as understood by human reason (natural
law theory), and the outgrowth of custom (the historical school): "Law.
• . is custom transformed, and not merely the will or reason of the lawmaker. Law spreads upward from the bottom and not only downward
from the top" as the command of the sovereign (p. 556). The dichotomy
which asks whether the law is part of the ideological superstructure or part
of the material base is itself wrong. Rather, law grows up from customs
and structures of the whole society and down from the policies and reasons
of the rulers to help integrate both aspects of social existence in the ongoing practice of a legal order serving justice and protecting rights. In this
synthesis, tradition plays a cardinal role, and "tradition is a blend of conscious and unconscious elements" embracing both the visible institutions
and works and the invisible aspirations, beliefs, and convictions (pp. 55758).
Certain reservations about Berman's presentation may be mentioned
in conclusion. Most central is doubt about the sweeping shift of the Papal
Revolution itself, to the end that the church becomes the first state and
Christianity becomes a program of reforming the world. The medievalists
will doubtless tackle this thesis with suitable vigor. Until then, however,
we can recall that comparable ideas appear in the debate surrounding the
Great Schism and filioque controversy (1054) and are popular in Eastern

Orthodox Russian church literature. They are expressed in Dostoevsky's
"Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" in The Brothers Karamazov, in The
Possessed, and in the theory of history of Dostoevsky's friend, the philosopher Vladimir Solovyov. 2 4 By this account, the chief culprits are rationalism and the lust for power that perverted Catholicism by replacing

Christianity with Caesar's dominion; thus Stavrogin believed "that Christ

24. See the section entitled "The Church as the State," in E. Sandoz, Political
Apocalypse: A Study of Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor 123 (1971); see also id. at 15570. Cf. H. Berman, supra note 1,at 178. No such outrageous condemnation as given
by Dostoevsky is present in Berman, one should stress.
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without an earthly kingdom cannot hold his ground upon earth, [and]
Catholicism by so doing proclaimed the Antichrist and ruined the whole
Western world." 25 Whatever the inspirational debt to these ideas owed by
Berman's thesis, there is no doubt that he tends to exaggerate the polarization of reason and faith in Anselm's thought (cf. pp. 195-97), however
fraught that tension is with later unfortunate developments in the rise of
modern scientism and instrumentalism.
The opposition between the prevailing teaching of the church and Augustine after 1075 also is overdrawn. Perhaps the key here is failure to
distinguish between the millennialism of the likes of Joachim of Flora and
the main strands of development in Christian theology and philosophy
during the period under discussion (see p. 112). The "new sense of time"
there commended by Berman certainly had its long term influence. But it
entailed the transformation of the world through a free descent of grace
in the Third Age of the Holy Spirit. Now this is no part of the church's
reform of the world, if we are to believe Thomas Aquinas, himself a believer in progress. The New Law of the Gospel will last till the end of the
world, Aquinas teaches, and he rejects the ancient Gnostic teachings of
Montanus and Priscilla, and of the Manicheans, in the same paragraph
with those of Joachim. These are "foolish notions," and the transformation of time through a coming of the Holy Ghost is "a senseless idea." 26
That radical modernity partly takes its rise from Joachim's speculation, to
issue into the very ideological distortions of reality that Berman is combatting, has been argued convincingly by Eric Voegelin. 2 7 Transformationism is, indeed, an essential ingredient of Christianity and found in many
versions in the East and the West. But the principal churches of the West
hold to Aquinas' view that the New Law lasts as definitive revelation to
the end of the world and do not fallaciously make immanent the Christian
eschatological teaching. The Realm of Freedom may be the utopian outcome of the Marxian dialectic, and it may also be a derivative of Christian

25. F. Dostoevsky, The Possessed 252 (C. Garnett trans. 1936). See I F. Dostoevsky,
The Brothers Karamazov 263 (C. Garnett trans. 1927), where the Grand Inquisitor confesses
to Christ as follows:
We are not working with Thee, but with him-that is our mystery. It's longeight centuries-since we have been on his side and not on Thine. Just eight
centuries ago, we took from him [Satan] what Thou didst reject with scorn
[during the temptation in the wilderness], that last gift he offered Thee, showing
Thee all the kingdoms of the earth. We took from him Rome and the sword
of Caesar, and proclaimed ourselves [i.e., the Roman Catholic Church] sole
rulers of the earth. . ..

For the Inquisitor's chronology, see E. Sandoz, supra note 24, at 124-25.
26. T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-I, Q. 106, A. 4 ad 2, in 2 Basic Writings of
St. Thomas Aquinas 956 (A.C. Pegis ed. 1945). Aquinas also stated that "no state of
the present life can be more perfect than that of the New Law .... ." Id. at 955.
27. E. Voegelin, supra note 10, at 107-32; E. Voegelin, supra note 21, at 92-99; also
K. Loewith, supra note 7, especially the chapter on Marx and the appendix on Joachim.
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and broadly biblical understandings of history. 28 But "My kingdom is not
of this world" is a permanent limitation on the prospective transfiguration
truth, both prior
of the world in time and an ineluctable part of Christian
29
to the twelfth century's events and subsequently.
It may also be said that Berman too readily assimilates the "ideology"
of the American Revolution and Founders to the "massive secularism" of
the Enlightenment philosophes and of the French Revolution. Despite recent comments in this journal to the contrary,30 the secularism, rampant
rationalism, and Deism of the American Founders have been exaggerated
and distorted in earlier literature of this century, a view that is being revised and corrected. The Protestant Christian vision of reality was, in fact,
a major source of thought in the period of the Declaration, Revolution,
and Constitution, as recent scholarship convincingly shows. 3' This also
means that a kind of watershed of radicality lies between the conservative
and truly restorative revolutions in the West down to the American Revradical and nihilistic revolutions from the
olution and the increasingly
32
French Revolution onward.
Finally, missing from Berman's argument (and a source of the despair
he expresses in the face of present troubles) is any sense that the Western
tradition of philosophy, religion, and law is more than merely a civilization's belief system. A sociological and historicist perspective dominates,
even though the natural law analysis is favorably reported as one element
among others to be considered. Yet the classical philosophers of Hellenic
antiquity and the Christ of the Gospels, upon whom the Western tradition
chiefly depend, asserted and proclaimed the truth about reality in the mode
of an ontology of abiding validity. The insights of Aristotle's science of
human affairs and of St. Paul's faith, whatever their differences, share a

28. See K. Loewith, supra note 7, ch. 2.
29. John 18:36.
30. Tushnet, Book Review, 45 La. L. Rev. 175 (1984) (reviewing R. Cord, Separation
of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction (1982)).
31. See generally American Political Writing During the Founding Era, 1760-1805 (C.
Hyneman & D. Lutz eds. 1983); Religion In American History (J. Mulder & J. Wilson
eds. 1978); M. Marty, Pilgrims In Their Own Land (1984); N. Hatch, The Sacred Cause
of Liberty (1977); G. Kelly, Politics and Religious Consciousness in America (1984);
Sandoz, Power and Spirit in the American Founding, in The Ethical Dimension of Political
Life 200-15, 267-70 (F. Canavan ed. 1983). See also A. Heimert, Religion and the American
Mind (1966). Although Professor Heimert's book contains its share of overstatements, its
argumentation and evidence nevertheless establish beyond all cavil its major thesis: lowchurch Protestantism played a capital role in eithteenth-century American political thought
and thus remains central to our political tradition. Even Thomas Jefferson is shown to
be a "non-trinitarian Christian" in recent work; see Jefferson's Extracts from the Gospels:
"The Philosophy of Jesus" and "The Life and Morals of Jesus" (D.Adams ed. 1983).
32. See H. Arendt, On Revolution (1963); A. Camus, The Rebel (A. Bower trans.
Vintage Books ed. 1958); J. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (1952); J.
Talmon, Political Messianism (1960); J. Talmon, The Myth of the Nation and the Vision
of Revolution (1981).
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claim to disclose enduring truth about the structure and dynamic process
of human reality as dimensions of the mysterious comprehensive horizon
of being itself. Herein lies the experiential-symbolic ground of all knowing,
partly expressed by the conviction of the intelligibility of reality, whatever
the deficiencies of human knowledge. Whether this or that individual, or
this or that nation or generation, accepts or ignores the fundamental structures of philosophical and revelatory truth is beside the point of their validity, from this perspective: "no amount of empirical defection from the
order of being can touch the truth of being itself." 3 Whether Berman
subscribes to this epistemology or is himself content with relativism of one
sort or another is not entirely clear. But the mystic-philosophers, prophets,
apostles, and their successors into the present are not asserting merely a
tradition-anymorethan the Christ of the Gospels asserts "I am the custom!"-but, rather, they are asserting the truth, as far as they can see.
This truth of objective reality progressively gained through science and
faith, and periodically lost through forgetfulness and social amnesia, constitutes historical reality itself together with the orders and disorders of the
human condition.3 4 The characteristically Western view is fundamentally
reflected in the spirit of Albert Einstein's great work in physics. There is
indeed an order whose beauty we celebrate, whose goodness we love, and
whose truth we are moved to find in many guises. This is not to assert a
dogma, and still debate, but to acknowledge openness to self-disclosing
reality and to recognize the foundation of reason itself in the faith that
"God does not play at dice" 3 -the physicist's analogue to the saint'sfides
quaerens intellectum (p. 175).36

33. E. Sandoz, supra note 24, at 214.
34. E.g., T. Aquinas, supra note 14, I-I1, Q. 97, A. 1, at xxii, 78-80,
It seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from imperfect to the
perfect. Hence, in speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early
philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterward perfected by those who
succeeded them. So also in practical matters; for those who first endeavored
to discover something useful for the human community, not being able by
themselves to take everything into consideration, set up certain institutions which
were deficient in many ways, and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers
who made institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of
the common weal.
Id. at 79.
35. Einstein 6 (A. French ed. 1979).
36. Translation: "Faith in search of understanding." For an elaboration of this view
of Western thought, see E. Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution 188-217 & passim (1981).
That the first principles of knowledge and being are indemonstrable and are apprehended
apperceptively to form the foundation of the participatory reality of human experience
is a common axiom of Aristotle, Anselm, and Aquinas, inter alios. Thus, Anselm in the
Proslogion begins from faith, and when the monk Gaunilon appears and wishes to take
the part of the fool (Psalms 14:1, 53: 1: "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no
God"), Anselm declines to do the impossible and debate a fool, saying: "I think it
sufficient that I answer the Catholic." The starting point of Anselm's reply to Gaunilon's
attack on the ontological argument is precisely faith: "I call on your faith and conscience

19851

BOOK REVIEW

But these reservations aside, Harold Berman has provided an erudite
and significant work as his own hard won therapy for the besetting distempers of our troubled age. He has placed the vast artifact of the legal mind
solidly in the foundation of the Western intellectual, spiritual, and social
order and its historical development. This is an extraordinary achievement.
He writes, somewhat as an anguished Richard Hooker did in another troubled time, "Though for no other cause, yet for this; that posterity may
know we have not loosely through silence permitted things to pass away
as in a dream." 37

to attest that this [rejection of the argument] is most false." Anselm, The Proslogion,
in Saint Anselm: Basic Writings 153-54 (S. Deane ed. & trans. 1962). The Proslogion is
itself, one should observe, not a treatise about God and his existence, but it is a "prayer
of love by the creature to the Creator to grant more perfect vision of His divinity."
Sandoz, Philosophical Dimensions of Dostoevsky's Politics, 40 J. Politics 648, 649, 670
(1978). Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI. 6; Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I. 19; T.
Aquinas, supra note 26, 1, Q. I, A. 8. Berman does not completely neglect the centrality
of faith for Anselm, of course; see H. Berman, supra note 1, at 194-98. "Anselm had
no intention of exalting reason at the expense of faith." Id. at 197.
37. 1 R. Hooker, supra note 19, at 77.

